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E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/15/2017
TAGS: [PREL](#) [KFLU](#) [TBIO](#) [EAGR](#) [AMED](#) [SENV](#) [WHO](#) [ID](#)
SUBJECT: NEXT STEPS ON DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY ON AVIAN
INFLUENZA

REF: A. JAKARTA 2157
[1](#)B. STATE 103509
[1](#)C. JAKARTA 1910
[1](#)D. JAKARTA 2168

Classified By: EAP Acting A/S Glyn Davies, reasons 1.4 (b, d, and e)

[1](#)1. (U) Action Requested: See Paras 3-4.

[1](#)2. (C) Department appreciates Ambassador Hume's thoughtful message, recommending a strategy to secure Government of Indonesia (GOI) resumption of viral sample sharing (refs A and C). Department is in general agreement with the overall strategy outlined in ref A.

[1](#)3. (C) We agree that Ambassador Hume should use the opportunities of his senior-level meetings in the coming days to make the points in para 4 regarding USG views of the situation and how the GOI should resume sharing of samples while we work together to address issues the GOI raised in the World Health Assembly (WHA) in May and most recently in the World Health Organization (WHO) Interdisciplinary Working Group meeting in Singapore. Our overriding goal is for the GOI to resume responsible participation in the WHO Global Influenza Surveillance Network (GISN). We leave to Ambassador Hume how best to shape the points below to achieve maximum effect and to gain better understanding of Indonesia's aims. The Department would appreciate Embassy Jakarta readouts, assessments, and recommendations.

[1](#)4. (SBU) Key messages:

-- We understand the critical threat Indonesia faces from the spread of the H5N1 strain of influenza virus in poultry and extend our sympathies to the families who have had children and other members infected by and killed by the virus. We also understand the suffering that would ensue were this virus to mutate into a pandemic strain.

-- We appreciate and support your efforts to contain the spread of the virus and to prepare for a possible human pandemic. Since 2005, we have committed more than \$37 million in assistance to Indonesia for avian and pandemic influenza through the U.S. Agency for International

Development and the U.S. Departments of Agriculture and Health and Human Services -- more than the level of assistance we have provided to any other country for the purpose of combatting avian and pandemic influenza.

-- We are strongly committed to international efforts aimed at promoting more fair and equitable access to the benefits of pandemic preparedness, including to pandemic vaccines. We have demonstrated our commitment by contributing \$10 million to the World Health Organization (WHO) Global Influenza Vaccine Action Plan, from which Indonesia recently received a \$2.5 million grant to increase its vaccine production capacity.

-- Indonesia, which currently suffers more than any other country from widespread avian influenza, is in a unique position from which it can facilitate global efforts to monitor the threat from this highly-pathogenic virus. We are deeply concerned, however, that the Government of Indonesia's refusal to share samples with the WHO Global Influenza Surveillance Network (GISN) represents a major threat to global health because experts around the world are unable to track mutations in the virus without shared samples.

-- The unencumbered sharing of viral samples for risk assessment and vaccine development is fundamental to our battling this potential pandemic. We urge you to resume sharing H5N1 influenza viruses immediately, even while we and other nations continue to discuss your understandable concerns, such as the rules and responsibilities of participating in the WHO GISN and the development of mechanisms to facilitate the sharing of benefits.

-- We are committed to supporting voluntary mechanisms for the sharing of benefits that improve pandemic preparedness after you resume sharing human suspected H5N1 influenza virus samples and isolates.

-- We look forward to your Government's prompt resumption of sample sharing and to further exchanging views on solutions to outstanding issues related to responsibilities and benefits of the GISN system.

RICE